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A NEW WORLD ORDER FOR CULTURAL
PROPERTY: ADDRESSING THE FAILURE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ART
MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION
While beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, works of
art have caught the eye of many a beholder across the globe;
those pieces of art, in fact, command a heavy monetary price
from such admirers. Since the beginning of exploration and
colonial conquest, and probably before that, humans have
been fascinated with the collection and display of works of
art.
The creation and appreciation of art is one of the many
ways in which human beings have distinguished themselves
from their less developed cousins in the animal kingdom, but
one peculiar aspect of human society certainly pervades the
world of art collection: humans are willing to pay a very high
economic price to collect and maintain works of art. In fact,
the societal cost of collecting and maintaining art is greater
than the salient monetary cost imposed upon purchasers. As
the international market for art blossomed in recent years,
the international market for the illicit trade in art
skyrocketed.'
This comment discusses and analyzes the two major
pieces of legislation, one international and one domestic, that
address the issue of the illegal trade in cultural property. It
analyzes both the 1970 United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property2 and the
1983 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 3
in order to see how effectively each addresses this global
1. See 3 P.J. O'KEEFE & L.V. PROTT, LAW AND THE CULTURE HERITAGE:
MOVEMENT 39 (1989).
2. 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter
UNESCO Convention].
3. 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. 1993).
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problem. As will be shown, both laws, for various reasons,
fail to eliminate the illicit trade in cultural property.
The comment proposes a series of changes to these laws
that would increase their efficiency in dealing with the illicit
art trade. 4 Essentially, these changes would provide an ave-
nue for better international and domestic control of this volu-
minous market and provide more stability for third-world
countries attempting to cultivate and display their unique
and important cultural heritage. Furthermore, the changes
would provide stricter controls in the United States to help
the administration combat the growing illegal trade in art
and cultural property.
The United States must re-examine its commitment, as
represented by its signing of the 1970 UNESCO Convention,
to curbing the illegal transfer of cultural property. Revising
these statutes and actively participating in UNESCO will go
a long way toward establishing a strong United States pres-
ence in this crucially important field. This field is in dire
need of strong moral and political leadership, and the United
States is in a position to develop this leadership.5 It is only
through mutual understanding of each other's cultural and
national identity that humankind can progress, as a global
village, toward a more harmonious future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Volume of Illegally Imported Cultural Property: A
Black Market Out of Control
The International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR)
compiles rough statistics on art thefts. In December of 1986,
IFAR reported an estimated total of 524 foreign thefts, com-
prising 1,823 objects of art. Even now, the 1986 "traffic in
stolen or smuggled art, now estimated at more than $1 billion
a year, has recently become second only to drugs in the
world's black-market economy." 7 In fact, Dr. Constance Low-
enthal, Director of the International Foundation for Art Re-
search, has suggested that the black market for art may now
4. See infra text accompanying notes 116-127.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 118-119.
6. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 41 (citing 1986 ART THEFT STATIS-
TICS, IFAR reports, Vol. 7, No. 10 at 4 (1986)).
7. Alexander Stille, Was This Statue Stolen?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at
1, 32.
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total twice the 1986 figure, and the illicit sale of art can truly
be considered a growth industry.' One commentator has
even said:
There is nothing new about the international movement
of works of art, including permanent transfers of works of
art from one nation to another. What is relatively new is
the virtually wholesale illicit expatriation of works of art
from nations rich in cultural heritage to nations that are
rich in economic terms.9
While economic forces can account for much of this exo-
dus of art from art-producing countries to economically rich
countries, there are other, more disturbing forces that accel-
erate this "wholesale illicit expatriation." 10 As Professor
James Nafziger points out, economic realities in developing,
art-rich countries make it extremely difficult for governments
in those countries to make concerted and effective efforts to-
ward protection of these culturally important pieces.11 The
forces that frustrate these systems include the susceptibility
of guards and officials to bribery, the scarcity of hard cur-
rency in developing countries, and the simple economic incen-
tive for looters to steal valuable pieces from cultural sites. 12
8. Joseph F. Edwards, Major Global Treaties for the Protection and Enjoy-
ment of Art and Cultural Objects, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 919, 921 (1991) (citing
Yarrow, The Modern $1 Billion Growth Industry: Stealing Great Art, INT'L HER-
ALD TRIB., March 21, 1990 (interviewing Dr. Constance Lowenthal, Director,
International Foundation for Art Research, New York)).
9. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). Edwards continues:
The economic forces acting in favor of these transfers have, in many
cases, become absolutely staggering. It has become routine for paint-
ings to sell for millions of dollars .... As early as 1986, it was esti-
mated that illicit trade in art and artifacts exceeded an annual figure
of one billion dollars. It is reasonable to assume that the upward pres-
sure on prices for paintings, as well as for antiquities, has resulted in a
rise in the illicit trade in art since that 1986 estimate.
Id.
10. Id.
11. James Nafziger, Regulation by the International Council of Museums:
An Example of the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Transna-
tional Legal Process, 2 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 231, 232-33 n.6 (1972).
12. Id. Nafziger pinpoints the following as factors that prevent adequate
enforcement of international cultural property agreements:
Reliance upon control systems of guards and inspectors that are often
prohibitively expensive for the art-rich developing countries; the ancil-
lary susceptibility of poorly paid guards and inspectors to bribes; the
susceptibility of other agents of law enforcement, including judges, to
bribes... ; the lure of hard currency from foreign purchasers in prefer-
ence to indigenous currency sometimes available from the government
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Given limited financial resources and the economic reward
for looters, it is no wonder that developing countries inade-
quately guard against the illicit trade in art. Nafziger con-
cludes that "it is not surprising that the laws are found to be
honored more in their breach than in their observance."13
The need to combat these problems spawned the creation
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and its domestic partner,
the 1983 Cultural Property Implementation Act. 14
B. The 1970 UNESCO Convention: The Minimum Legal
Requirements
In an effort to address the growing illegal trade in cul-
tural property and heritage, 5 the international community,
through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO), came together to negotiate a
comprehensive international treatise.'" The 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property17
arose out of those negotiations and stands as the most impor-
tant and comprehensive international attempt to prevent the
illicit traffic of cultural property."1
Though the United States was originally uninterested in
the drafting process of the Convention, 9 the changing polit-
ical climate of the 1960's spurred the United States into ac-
or local purchasers; topographic and logistic obstacles, particularly in
the remote, often treasure-laden, areas of developing countries; an iron
law of inflation that sets prices on the international antiquities market
beyond government control; draconian, sometimes completely proscrip-
tive, export controls and embargoes that counter-productively drive up
the market and invite disobedience; the difficulty of controlling the
movement of items intended for re-export in such entrepots as Switzer-
land and Lebanon [sic]; and the impossibility of sealing off borders and
intercepting diplomatic pouches, which may contain contraband in cul-
tural property.
Id. (citation omitted).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See supra text accompanying note 5.
16. See 3 O'KEEFE & PROr, supra note 1, at 726-28. In fact, the impetus
for the UNESCO Convention came out of European concerns at the end of
World War I that United States collectors might take unfair advantage of Eu-
rope's impoverished countries by buying art at reduced prices in a depressed
market. Id. at 726-27.
17. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2.
18. See 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 726.
19. Id. at 727.
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tive participation in the negotiations.2 ° In particular, the
United States delegation objected to "the obligation to impose
import controls over any cultural property so designated by
the country of export, and thought that the system would re-
quire an 'extremely burdensome and expensive customs ap-
paratus.' It did not want to control internal transfers and it
made many other objections to the Secretariat draft."21 In
the end, the UNESCO Convention was adopted at the Six-
teenth Session of the General Conference of UNESCO in No-
vember 1970.22 There are twenty-six articles to the UNESCO
Convention;23 this comment, however, discusses only those
sections that were enacted in the United States domestic leg-
islation or that arguably should have been.
The United States ratified the UNESCO Convention
treaty in 1972, subject to one reservation and six understand-
ings.24 Moreover, most of the art-exporting countries of the
world, for various reasons, have not become parties to the
20. Id. at 727-28.
21. Id. at 728 (quoting Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade
in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 372 (1982) [hereinafter Bator, An Essay)).
22. Id. at 727. The final vote, taken by hand only (thus erasing any quanti-
tative record of which countries voted for or against), was 77 for, 1 against and
8 abstentions. Id.
23. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2.
24. See SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 230 (1977). These reservations and understand-
ings include the following:
The United States reserves the right to determine whether or not
to impose export controls over cultural property.
The United States understands the provisions of the Convention to
be neither self-executing nor retroactive.
The United States understands Article 3 not to modify property
interests in cultural property under the laws of the states parties.
The United States understands Article 7(a) to apply to institutions
whose acquisition policy is subject to national control under existing
domestic legislation and not to require the enactment of new legisla-
tion to establish national control over other institutions. The United
States understands that Article 7(b) is without prejudice to other reme-
dies, civil or penal, available under the laws of the states parties for
the recovery of stolen cultural property to the rightful owner without
payment of compensation. The United States is further prepared to
take the additional steps contemplated by Article 7(b)(ii) for the return
of covered stolen cultural property without payment of compensation,
except to the extent required by the Constitution of the United States,
for those state parties that agree to do the same for the United States
institutions.
3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 794.
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treaty.25 In fact, as of 1990, there were only seventy-eight
parties to the Convention,26 and the United States remains
one of the only significant art-importing nations to have im-
plemented the Convention through domestic law.27 To date,
France, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
Benelux countries have not ratified the treaty, although It-
aly, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Canada, Australia, and the
United States have done so. 28
The Preamble sets out the goals of the Convention and
"notes the duty of States toward their own cultural heritage
and that of all nations."29 The Preamble states:
[T]he illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of
cultural property is an obstacle to that understanding be-
tween nations which it is part of Unesco's mission to pro-
mote by recommending to interested States, interested
conventions to this end .. the protection of cultural heri-
tage can be effective only if organized both nationally and
internationally among States working in close co-opera-
tion .... 30
25. See 3 id. at 793-95.
26. Barbara Borst, Culture: Fight on to End Illegal Trade in World Art,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, February 19, 1994.
27. See Marie C. Malaro, Legal Problems of Museum Administration: Cur-
rent Problems in Collections Management, C479 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 19, *22 (1990)
available in Westlaw JLR database. Auction houses, great contributors to the
British economy, have been cited as one reason why that market has not re-
sponded to the Convention. 3 O'KEEFE & PROrr, supra note 1, at 786. Switzer-
land has cited problems with custom control and constitutional difficulties. 3
id. In fact, United States acceptance was derailed several times (in 1973, 1975,
and 1979) by a concerted lobbying effort of art dealers. 3 id.
28. Borst, supra note 26.
29. 3 'KEEFE & PROTr, supra note 1, at 729.
30. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 224. The Preamble specifically states:
Considering that the interchange of cultural property among na-
tions for scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the
knowledge of the civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all
peoples and inspires mutual respect and appreciation among nations,
Considering that cultural property constitutes one of the basic ele-
ments of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can
be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information re-
garding its origin, history and traditional setting,
Considering that it is incumbent upon every State to protect the
cultural property existing within its territory against the dangers of
theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export,
Considering that, to avert these dangers, it is essential for every
State to become increasingly alive to the moral obligations to respect
its own cultural heritage and that of all nations,
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The Convention that followed was an attempt to reconcile the
desire of art-importing states to promote the alienability of
cultural property with the needs of exporting states to curb
the illicit trade of such property. 3 '
In defining what constitutes "cultural property," the Con-
vention, under Article I, took a rather expansive and categor-
ical approach.32 Specifically, each signatory state must de-
cide that its cultural property "is specifically designated...
as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history,
literature, art or science" among certain categories of ob-
jects.3 3 O'Keefe & Prott state that Article I, being categori-
Considering that, as cultural institutions, museums, libraries and
archives should ensure that their collections are built up in accordance
with universally recognized moral principles,
Considering that the illicit import, export and transfer of owner-
ship of cultural property is an obstacle to that understanding between
nations which it is part of Unesco's mission to promote by recom-
mending to interested States, international conventions to this end,
Considering that the protection of cultural heritage can be effec-
tive only if organized both nationally and internationally among States
working in close co-operation,
Considering that the Unesco General Conference adopted a Rec-
ommendation to this effect in 1964 ....
Adopts this Convention on the fourteenth day of November 1970.
Preamble, UNESCO Convention, supra note 2.
31. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTr, supra note 1, at 782. "[T]he text of the UNESCO
Convention was ... [designed to persuade] a majority of UNESCO to adopt a
moderate and compromise position. The position of the Soviet bloc countries
and many third-world countries, which would have effectively ended all inter-
national trade in cultural objects, was rejected." PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE IN ART 68 (1983).
32. See 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 729-30.
33. Id. at 730. The categories of property which, under Article I of the 1970
UNESCO Convention, can be designated as important are as follows:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anat-
omy, and objects of paleontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and
technology and military and social history, to the life of national lead-
ers, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national
importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clan-
destine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites
which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions,
coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on
any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and
manufactured articles decorated by hand);
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cally inclusive, serves to describe "the ambit within which ob-
jects are to be selected for export and import control, thus
limiting the kinds of property for which States may be obliged
to implement export, and more importantly, reciprocal import
controls."34 Presumably, objects outside these descriptive
categories would not be considered cultural property.
The United States objected to many of the draft provi-
sions of Article I because "it put power into the hands of ex-
porting States to dictate to an importing State what that
State could legally import, regardless of that State's own sub-
stantive interests."35 As will be seen later, some of these con-
cerns found voice in the United States' legislative enactment
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the Convention on Cul-
tural Property Implementation Act of 1983.36
Article III of the UNESCO Convention states that "[t]he
import, export or transfer of ownership of cultural property
effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this Con-
vention... shall be illicit."37 There is much controversy as to
the meaning of this phrase and its appurtenant obligations,
although it appears fairly straightforward on its face.38 The
United States Senate, ratifying the Convention, declared that
"the United States understands Article 3 [of the 1970
UNESCO Convention], not to modify property interest in cul-
tural property under the laws of the [sic] states parties."39
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publi-
cations of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.)
singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collection;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musi-
cal instruments.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, at 289-90.
34. 3 O'KEEFE & PRorr, supra note 1, at 730.
35. 3 id. at 731 (quoting Bator, An Essay, supra note 21, at 328).
36. 3 id. at 796.
37. 3 id. at 734.
38. 3 id. at 736. Different commentators have alternatively interpreted the
article as requiring states to regard as illicit their national law transactions
that breach the national law of another state party whose law is in accordance
with the Convention, that it means that states parties are required to regard
such acts as unlawful in international law, or that it means nothing at all. 3 id.
39. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 230.
984 [Vol. 34
1994] UNESCO CONVENTION 985
One United States commentator wrote that "Article 3, declar-
ing that transfers of ownership of cultural property contrary
to the Convention are 'illicit', is a mysterious provision that
will not be operative in the United States, which expressed
its understanding that it does not modify domestic property
law."4° Indeed, such a position is not unique among members
of the international community.4 '
Article VI of the UNESCO Convention requires parties to
provide a certificate that authorizes export of the cultural
property, to prohibit any export that does not have such a cer-
tificate, and to publicize said prohibition.42 Many commenta-
tors have belittled its significance,43 particularly in light of
Article VII,44 and the United States made a reservation to
this part of the Convention that evoked a great deal of com-
mentary.45 Another commentator wrote: "the United States
could not and would not give up the right to decide for itself
whether and when to apply export controls over works of
40. 3 O'KEEFE & PROrr, supra note 1, at 377 (citing Bator, An Essay, supra
note 21).
41. For instance, Germany has taken the position that Article 3 does not
impose an obligation to nullify transactions involving unlawful import or export
and "assumes that transfer of ownership and acquisition abroad . . . are not
affected by Article 3." 3 id. at 734.
42. 3 id. at 744. Article VI specifically states:
The States Parties to the Convention undertake:
(a) To introduce an appropriate certificate in which the exporting
State would specify that the export of the cultural property in question
is authorized. The certificate should accompany all items of cultural
property exported in accordance with the regulations;
(b) to prohibit the exportation of cultural property from their territory
unless accompanied by the above-mentioned export certificate;
(c) to publicize this prohibition by appropriate means, particularly
among persons likely to export or import cultural property.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, at 290-91.
43. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 744. Ronald Abramson & Stephen
Huttler felt that as "import controls were restricted to property stolen from pub-
lic institutions (Art. 7(b)(i)), property from such institutions which is not 'stolen'
and culturally important property, even if stolen, from private collections is not
protected." 3 id. at 744 (citing Ronald D. Abramson & Stephen B. Huttler, The
Legal Response to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 LAW & PoL'v IN
INT'L Bus. 932, 959-61 (1973)).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 44-51.
45. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTr, supra note 1, at 744. The United States reserva-
tion said "[tihe United States reserves the right to determine whether or not to
impose export controls over cultural property." WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at
230.
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art"4 6 and "almost every country in the world restricts and
regulates the export of cultural property; the outstanding ex-
ception is the United States of America."47 Though it has en-
gendered controversy, Article VI does ensure that State par-
ties who set up export controls will have them recognized by
other State parties,48 and it also serves as a guide for devel-
oping countries to establish model export controls.49
The first draft of Article VII of the Convention would
have complemented the export control provision of Article VI
"by requiring importing States to treat cultural property ille-
gally exported from its State of origin as an illegal import."50
After the United States entered the discussion, the text and
subsequent effect of Article VII became much more limited in
scope.51
46. 3 O'KEEFE & PROnr, supra note 1, at 377 (quoting Bator, An Essay
supra note 21).
47. 3 id. at 714, 744-45 (arguing that the United States does have some
export controls, although on a very small category of materials, and that the
suggestion that Article VI is impracticable is unfair).
48. See 3 id. at 744.
49. See 3 id. at 745.
50. Abramson & Huttler, supra note 43, at 951.
51. See 3 O'KEEFE & PROrr, supra note 1, at 745. Article VII specifically
states:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake:
(a) To take the necessary measures, consistent with national legisla-
tion, to prevent museums and similar institutions within their territo-
ries from acquiring cultural property originating in another State
Party which has been illegally exported after entry into force of this
Convention, in the States concerned. Whenever possible, to inform a
State of origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such cultural
property removed from that State after the entry into force of this Con-
vention in both States;
(b)(i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum
or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in an-
other State Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this
Convention for the States concerned, provided that such property is
documented as appertaining to the inventory of that institution;
(b)(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate
steps to recover and return any such cultural property imported after
the entry into force of this Convention in both States concerned, pro-
vided, however, that the requesting State shall pay just compensation
to an innocent purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that prop-
erty. Requests for recovery and return shall be made through diplo-
matic offices. The requesting Party shall furnish, at its expense, the
documentation and other evidence necessary to establish its claim for
recovery and return. The Parties shall impose no customs duties or
other charges upon cultural property returned pursuant to this Article.
UNESCO CONVENTION
Article VII(a) requires that a State party "take the neces-
sary measures, consistent with national legislation, to pre-
vent museums and similar institutions within their territo-
ries from acquiring cultural property originating in another
State Party which has been illegally exported after entry into
force of this Convention. ,52 There are several significant
points regarding this section of the Convention. The United
States lobbied for the inclusion of language "consistent with
national legislation" and stated "that the section would be in-
terpreted so as to confine the effect of this measure to muse-
ums whose acquisition policies are controlled by the State."53
Article VII(b)(ii) requires that states:
prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a mu-
seum or a religious or secular public monument or similar
institution in another State Party to this Convention after
the entry into force of this Convention for the States con-
cerned, provided that such property is documented as ap-
pertaining to the inventory of that institution.54
Several aspects of this section deserve close scrutiny.
For instance, the cultural property must have been stolen
from a museum or other public institution, and it must have
been documented as being a part of that institution's inven-
tory.55 Furthermore, the Convention does not address the is-
sue of other types of cultural property, such as new archaeo-
logical finds, which are not immediately catalogued by a state
institution.5" Even if these materials were stolen, they would
not fall under the auspices of Article VII(b)(ii) protection.57
While many of the provisions of the UNESCO Conven-
tion seem overly restrictive, the drafters did provide for ac-
tion in cases of extraordinary circumstances. Article IX has
All expenses incident to the return and delivery of the Cultural prop-
erty shall be borne by the requesting Party.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, at 291-92.
52. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 226.
53. 3 O'KEEFE & PRoTT, supra note 1, at 745.
54. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, at 291-92.
55. See 3 O'KEEFE & PRoTr, supra note 1, at 752 (noting that the United
States recognizes an obligation to prevent import only if an object is stolen).
56. Cf JESSICA L. DARRABY, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: DUTIES OF COLLECTORS, TRADERS AND CLAIM-
ANTS, 297 PLI/Pat 659 at 17 (1990) (commenting on the meaning of the United
States' identical legislative enactment of Article VII(b)(i) of the UNESCO Con-
vention) available in Westlaw, TP-ALL database.
57. See 3 O'KEEFE & PRorr, supra note 1, at 748.
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been referred to as the crisis provision of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, and, according to Paul Bator, it is essentially "a
direct descendant of the 'crisis' provision contained in the
United States alternative draft."5 8 It provides:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patri-
mony is in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or eth-
nological materials may call upon other States Parties
who are affected. The States Parties to the Convention
undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a con-
certed international effort to determine and to carry out
the necessary measures, including the control of exports
and imports and international commerce in the specific
materials concerned. Pending agreement each State con-
cerned shall take provisional measures to the extent feasi-
ble to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage
of the requesting State.59
Note also that, in 1985, the United States left UNESCO
as an active participant, yet has pledged to remain committed
to the 1970 UNESCO Convention.60
C. The Domestic Legal Requirements as Defined by the
1983 Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act
The United States' enabling legislation, according to sev-
eral commentators, has further restricted the United States'
duties and obligations under the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion. 1 In fact, after ratification of the Convention, UNESCO
was clearly concerned about the United States' reservations
to and understanding of the Convention.6 2 In particular, the
Senate said, "[t]he United States considers the provisions of
the Convention to be neither self-executing nor retroactive
[and t]he consent of the United States to be bound by the
Convention is subject to the reservation and understanding
in the instrument of accession and to the provisions of this
58. Id. at 379 (quoting Bator, An Essay, supra note 21).
59. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, at 230.
60. DARRABY, supra note 56, at 6.
61. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 8, at 927-29. O'Keefe & Prott explain
"the very restrictive definition of 'archaeological or ethnological material' has
significantly restricted the ambit of Article 9, which has not defined this mate-
rial, just as the definition of 'object of archaeological interest' in s.2601(2)(c)(i)
significantly restricts the much more general definition in Article I of the Con-
vention." 3 O'KEEFE & PRorr, supra note 1, at 799.
62. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTW, supra note 1, at 795.
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legislation."63 UNESCO was quite concerned about this last
section, as it hinted that the Convention would be
subordinate to United States domestic legislation.6 4 Mexico
clearly felt these reservations amounted to inadequate com-
pliance with the Convention.65
The 1983 Convention on Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act (C.C.P.I.A.) is the Congressional legislation that offi-
cially enacted the 1970 UNESCO Convention.66 Passed some
twelve years after ratification of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion, only Articles 1,67 VII,68 and IX69 are reflected in the
United States legislation of the UNESCO Convention.7 °
The C.C.P.I.A. reflects the goals of Article VII(b) at sec-
tion 2607."' The statute provides:
No article of cultural property documented as appertain-
ing to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular
public monument or similar institution in any State
which is stolen from such institution after the effective
date of this title, or after the date of entry into force of the
Convention for the State Party, whichever date is later,
may be imported in the United States.
72
Again, the statute restricts the importation of works stolen
from a museum or religious or secular institution after the
enactment of the legislation. The legislation completely ig-
nores works "stolen" prior to 1983, the year of enactment of
the C.C.P.I.A.73 As such, there is a thirteen-year gap of en-
forcement between the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the
1983 C.C.P.I.A.
63. 3 id. at 795.
64. UNESCO queried the United States, "[ilf the United States intends the
phrase ['to the provisions of this legislation'] to mean that the legislation in
question is to be considered as a reservation to the Convention, this would
mean that the Convention would be subordinate to United States national leg-
islation, and such a situation would seem not to be in conformity with the inter-
national law of treaties." 3 id. at 795 (quoting UNESCO Doc. LAlDepository/
1984/3 Annex V).
65. See 3 id. at 796.
66. Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 307, 96 Stat. 2329, 2358 (1982) (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2606 (1988)), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4078,
4108.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
70. See 3 O'KEEFE & PRoTr, supra note 1, at 797.
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1988).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The United States enactment of Article IX, the crisis pro-
vision, is by far the most complex aspect of the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act. 74 Section 2602 au-
thorizes the President of the United States to "enter into a
bilateral or multilateral agreement in response to the request
of a State party whose cultural patrimony is being pillaged; it
does not impose upon the President any obligation to enter
into such an agreement."75
More importantly, however, section 2602(c) forbids the
President from entering into any such agreements "unless
the pertinent import restrictions under the agreements will
be applied in concert with similar actions taken by other na-
tions... which have significant imports in the relevant cul-
tural material."76 In other words, if the requesting party does
not enter into a similar arrangement with other art-import-
ing countries, most of whom have not enacted the 1970
UNESCO Convention,77 the President's hands are tied by the
terms of section 2602(c), and may not act at least to stem the
illegal tide into the United States. One commentator sug-
gested that this section essentially turned the 1970 UNESCO
Convention into an agreement to agree.78 Also, import re-
strictions may be imposed only on archaeological and ethno-
logical materials that meet the restrictive definitions.79
Lastly, the President may only enter into agreement
with other party states if that "State Party has taken meas-
ures consistent with the Convention to protect its cultural
patrimony." 0 Significantly, cultural patrimony is not de-
fined in either the 1970 UNESCO Convention or in the 1983
Cultural Property Implementation Act.81
74. See 3 O'KEEFE & PRoTr, supra note 1, at 797.
75. Edwards, supra note 8, at 929.
76. Id.
77. 3 O'KEEFE & PROrr, supra note 1, at 784-85.
78. 3 id. at 797.
79. Archaeological material must be 'of cultural significance; and at least
250 years old; and normally discovered as a result of scientific excavation, clan-
destine or accidental digging, or exploration on land or under water." 19 U.S.C.
2602(c) (1988). See also Malaro, supra note 27, at 4. Ethnological material
must be 'the product of a tribal or nonindustrial society and important to the
cultural heritage of a people because of its distinctive characteristics, compara-
tive rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the origins, development, or
history of that people." Id.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (1988).
81. See supra notes 2-3.
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The provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the
1983 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
have not been effective at curbing the illegal flow of cultural
property. 2 The illegal art market has exploded in recent
years and it is that ineffectiveness which allows the illegal
art market to flourish. These shortcomings and problems are
analyzed in the following section.
III. ANALYSIS
A. 1970 UNESCO Convention: The Failure of
International Cooperation
There are many difficulties with the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention, especially given the non-uniformity of interpretation
by those nations enacting the treaty through domestic legis-
lation. Although earlier drafts of the Convention had provi-
sions prohibiting reservations, the final draft, as is customary
in international documents, permitted such reservations.8 3
While such reservations may be customary, "there is in every
treaty a certain core content which parties must accept if
they wish other States to acknowledge them as parties to the
treaty at all ...."'
The reservation problem plagues the 1970 UNESCO
Convention as well; when the final draft of the Convention
was circulated to the States parties to the Convention, the
Mexican government responded with the following
pronouncement:
The Government of the United Mexican States has stud-
ied the text of the comments and reservations on the Con-
vention.., made by the United States of America .... It
has reached the conclusion that these comments and res-
ervations are not compatible with the purposes and aims
of the Convention .... 85
While some other countries "may feel that the United States
has, for the first time, made ... some minimal commitment
to the principles of control of the illicit trade and that com-
mitment should not be jeopardized,"8 6 other countries, such
as Mexico, believe that the commitment of the United States
82. See supra section II.A.
83. 3 O'KEEFE & PROr, supra note 1, at 776.
84. 3 id.
85. 3 id. at 776-77.
86. 3 id. at 777.
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to controlling the illicit trade in art is illusory."7 As shown in
the implementing legislation of the United States, this per-
ception is well founded and stems from the C.C.P.I.A.'s
ineffectiveness.88
As Professor Edwards points out, with regard to Articles
III and VI, "since the Convention is not self-implementing,
the effectiveness of these two provisions is undermined to the
extent that State parties, especially the importing ones, fail
to fully implement the essential obligations of the Conven-
tion in their domestic laws." 9 As shown earlier, very few im-
porting party States have implemented the provisions of the
1970 UNESCO Convention into domestic law;90 as such, the
effectiveness of these two provisions is entirely suspect. Both
provisions are effectively meaningless and must be rewritten
to encourage greater participation. Without enforcement pro-
visions, Articles III and VI are frustrated in their very
purpose.
With regard to Article VII(a) of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention,91 O'Keefe & Prott point out that its interpretation of
the United States almost completely eviscerates the meaning
by this section because there are only a handful of state-con-
trolled museums in the United States.92 Furthermore, some
United States commentators believe the United States dele-
gation intended this effect, especially considering that Con-
gress removed one of the most important steps in stemming
illicit traffic.93
Without an ability to control and monitor those museums
not controlled by the states, the United States nearly aban-
dons the entire ambit of authority originally intended to be
87. 3 id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 61-82 and infra notes 109-124.
89. Edwards, supra note 8, at 930.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
92. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 745. Of the many museums in this
country, only the Library of Congress and the National Archives are clearly
controlled by the United States government, while the Smithsonian and the
National Gallery are arguably under such state control. Id.
93. See, e.g., Abramson & Huttler, supra note 43, at 965-66; 3 O'KEEFE &
PROTT, supra note 1, at 380 (citing Bator, An Essay, supra note 21). But see
JAMEs NAFZIGER, ARTICLE 7(A) OF THE UNESCO CONVENTION, ART LAW: Do-
MESTIC & INTERNATIONAL 387 (1975) (L.D. DuBoff ed.) (arguing that Article
VII(a) represents a compromise between a weak amendment requiring only eth-
ical obligations and a strong one that would prohibit any acquisition without an
export certificate).
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supplied by this provision. Not only does the understanding
of the United States render it useless, but it demonstrates a
clear frustration of the overall purposes of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention. While control over state-run museums is a
given, the real problems of illicit transfer and import of cul-
tural property lie in the acquisition policies of private muse-
ums, institutions, and collectors, because they are much more
difficult to monitor.94 Article VII(a) ultimately fails to control
the illegal art trade, especially as it concerns non-state-run
museums and institutions.
Article VII(b) 95 similarly fails, because it does not ad-
dress the issue of artifacts stolen from new archaeological
finds. Such finds are often not immediately catalogued by a
state institution,96 and, although technically stolen, such ob-
jects would not fall under the protection of Article VII(b).97 If
such an object is stolen from a freshly discovered archaeologi-
cal site, Article VII(b) would not be available to help return
the object to the site or to prevent its import to an art-market
state. This would frustrate honest attempts by impoverished
countries to develop and safely explore their cultural heri-
tage. Such a provision is completely disingenuous, because it
fails to address those problems that are often at the center of
illegal art-market controversies. As O'Keefe & Prott also sug-
gest, the processing of a claim:
depends on the commitment and competence of its own
national government, as well as an appreciation of inter-
national politics in such bilateral requests, e.g. if there is
a breach of diplomatic relations at the time when stolen
property is suspected to be or is found in the importing
country, the chances of activating Article 7(b)(ii) will not
be high.98
Given the lack of cultural and legal experts in these coun-
tries, meeting these requirements will be very difficult for
the art-exporting states.9 9 Countries will not have the ex-
perts to process the claims, nor the political clout, outside the
auspices of the United Nations, to force the more powerful
94. For a discussion of museum and private-collector involvement in the
illegal art market, see 3 O'KEEFE & PROTr, supra note 1, at 52-61.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
96. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
97. See 3 O'KEEFE & PROrr, supra note 1, at 748.
98. See 3 id.
99. See 3 id. at 749.
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art-importing countries to listen to their claims. Exercising
this provision, then, will be most difficult for those parties
who need it.
Article IX, the so-called crisis provision, 100 also presents
many difficulties for enforcement. As many commentators
suggest, there are serious linguistic and substantive interpre-
tation problems with this aspect of the Convention. 1 1 Of
particular note, O'Keefe & Prott point out that the emergency
situation only applies to pillage of archaeological and ethno-
graphic materials.0 2 Many other classes of cultural property
(as defined in Article I of the UNESCO Convention) are not,
however, subject to these emergency provisions. 10 3 Further-
more, countries such as the United States have restricted the
interpretation of this provision even further through their
own implementing legislation.
104
Also, Professor Edwards points out that "[t]hese later ob-
ligations (controls) are essentially dormant until a state party
requests that they be imposed on the basis that its cultural
patrimony is being jeopardized from pillage." 0 5 The
processes for such requests can be costly and riddled with de-
lays and bureaucratic stumbling blocks. 10 6 Essentially, for
O'Keefe & Prott, "[t]he United States interpretation [of Arti-
cle IX] reduces the 1970 UNESCO Convention to an 'agree-
ment to agree' ..... o7 There is no way for exporting states to
force cooperation and enforcement due to the lack of enforce-
ment measures and the fact that not many countries have en-
acted its principles. Countries with more political clout can
simply bully those less-developed nations that have the most
cultural property to export. As such, Article IX does little to
protect party States from losing valuable cultural heritage
from pillage by thieves and looters.
100. See 3 id. at 755.
101. For a discussion of those linguistic interpretation problems, see 3 id. at
755-59.
102. 3 id. at 755-56.
103. 3 id. at 756. As O'Keefe & Prott point out, Article IX "is of no use to
countries which may wish to protect a rich heritage of contemporary art from
'pillage'. A country such as Italy, where art smuggling is rife, will never be able
to call for assistance to protect even its art and sculpture of the Renaissance
period under Article 9." 3 id.
104. 3 id. at 756. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
105. Edwards, supra note 8, at 926.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 95-113.
107. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 797.
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The United States effectively eviscerated those provi-
sions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention intended to restrict
the transfer of cultural property.1 0 8 While promoting the
legal transfer of cultural property, this meddling has ad-
versely affected the enforcement of export and import con-
trols. As such, the 1970 UNESCO Convention needs serious
revision, and the United States must re-examine its roles,
both in UNESCO and in the prevention of the illegal import
and export of cultural property.
B. The 1983 Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act: Half-Hearted Enactment of a
Flawed Convention
The implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by
the United States leaves much to be desired. As discussed
previously, the reservations and understandings by which
the United States ratified the treaty call into question the
sincerity of the government's alleged desire to implement
fully the goals of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 10 9
C.C.P.I.A. section 2607, which implements Article
VII(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, severely restricts
the ability of private individuals and private institutions to
retrieve stolen cultural property. 110 Furthermore, the legis-
lation completely ignores works "stolen" prior to 1983, the
year of enactment of the C.C.P.I.A. 1 ' As there are only two
state-run museums in the United States,'1 2 this section ex-
cludes most museums from making a claim under section
2607. In effect, section 2607 is moot in the United States.
The emergency provisions of section 2602, implementing
Article IX of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, 113 are also
flawed from inception. The limitation, under section
2602(a)(1)(B), that the President may enter into import re-
striction agreements with a state party only if that "Party
has taken measures consistent with the Convention to pro-
tect its cultural patrimony"" 4 binds the hands of the Presi-
dent in all circumstances.
108. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 61-65.
110. 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1988).
111. See supra text accompanying note 73.
112. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 745.
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (1988).
114. Id.
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This emergency provision phrase is also ambiguous be-
cause "cultural patrimony" is not defined under the UNESCO
Convention; incorporating it into domestic legislation makes
little sense and is certainly not helpful to other countries try-
ing to interpret the domestic legislation of the United States.
It also may be economically impracticable for many develop-
ing countries to enact such measures with any degree of
effectiveness. 115
As one commentator has stated, "[a]t most, these controls
could theoretically cover archaeological material from all for-
eign countries. But realistically, what will result is a series of
negotiated arrangements dealing with specific categories of
archaeological and ethnological materials with those friendly
countries that can demonstrate the need for this
cooperation." 11
6
Furthermore, O'Keefe & Prott argue that implementing
the emergency measures of section 2602 "will impose a con-
siderable burden on a State making out its case. The United
States clearly wanted to avoid a general investigative under-
taking as set out in Article 9 [of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion]."117 In fact, most proceedings, according to O'Keefe &
Prott, will take a very long time, an unconscionable delay
where, as in the case of looting, time is of the essence.'
Once the goods are stolen, the job of preventing their export
becomes much more difficult. By the time the appeal process
is completed, the looted art may be impossible to recover.
Also, the requirement that the President cannot act un-
less the requesting party has made similar arrangements
with other art-importing states is absolutely absurd. This re-
quirement serves no purpose other than to frustrate the aims
of Article IX. 1 9 Given that most other art-importing coun-
tries have not fully implemented the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
115. See Nafziger, supra note 11.
116. M.B. Feldman, Proceedings of the Panel on the U.S. Enabling Legisla-
tion of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 4 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 97 (1976) (commenting on an earlier, but essentially
similar, draft of this provision).
117. 3 O'KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 1, at 798.
118. 3 id. at 798. To date, five requests have been made by states party to
the Convention to the United States (from Canada, El Salvador, Bolivia, Peru,
and Guatemala). Only the El Salvadoran and Bolivian requests have been ap-
proved. 3 id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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tion, 120 this exception renders Articles IX useless in the
United States. If no agreement can be made without concur-
rent agreements, and if other countries have not imple-
mented the Convention, Article IX's provisions will never be
exercised. Effectively, the President will never be able to act,
and affected countries will not receive the assistance they
need.
It is crucial to note that not a single case has been
brought under C.C.P.I.A. to date.121 Given the voluminous
illegal trade in art, this fact stands as empirical proof that
the act does not effectively address the problem of illicit cul-
tural property transfers described in Section II of this com-
ment. As one commentator notes, "the fact that CPIA is rela-
tively new, applies proactively and has a high qualification
threshold, and therefore a relatively restrictive impact, sug-
gests that the efficacy of awarding cultural property to claim-
ants under the UNESCO-inspired scheme is still subject to
question." 122 In essence, this commentator suggests that no
claimant will ever be able to succeed in getting protection
under the enactment of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by the
United States. 123
Essentially, the domestic enactment of the 1970
UNESCO Convention by the United States is a hollow and
ineffective effort at assisting the international community in
addressing the problem of illicit traffic in cultural
property. 124
IV. PROPOSALS
As was shown previously, there are numerous substan-
tive problems with both the 1970 UNESCO Convention and
the 1983 Cultural Property Implementation Act.125 The fol-
lowing proposals will improve the implementation and en-
forcement of both pieces of legislation. These proposals will
120. See supra text accompanying note 25.
121. See DARRABY, supra note 56, at 16.
122. Id. at 6.
123. Id.
124. Again, it bears repeating that there have been no cases brought under
the C.C.P.I.A. to date. Id. at 16. "It must be emphasized that no stolen cultural
property has ever been returned to a Convention signatory under CPIA Section
308 nor has any request every been made by a foreign nation thereunder." Id.
125. See supra sections III.A. and III.B.
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help both statutes achieve the goals outlined in the preamble
to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 12 6
A. Amendments and Changes to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention
First and foremost, the United States government must
make a firm commitment to rejoin and take an active role in
promoting the goals not only of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion, but also those of the UNESCO body in general. Created
to promote global understanding of the vast diversity of cul-
tures in this world, 2 7 UNESCO can do its job only with the
full backing and moral force of the United States. As is em-
pirically proven every time an international crisis arises, the
United Nations, and by extension UNESCO, is virtually a
useless body without the active participation of the United
States of America. 2 ' Promotion of global cooperation in the
area of preventing the illicit trade in cultural property must
start with a firm commitment on the part of the United
States to upholding the goals and standards of the 1970
UNESCO Convention.
To this end, UNESCO should also make an active effort
to assist signatory nations to explore, categorize, and culti-
vate their cultural property assets. Financial and technical
assistance should be given to help poorer countries explore
their heritage, so that other countries eventually may benefit
from the knowledge and understanding of their heritage.
Along those lines, UNESCO should also use its resources to
enforce and uphold the provisions of the 1970 Convention.
Without such enforcement provision, as O'Keefe & Prott
note, the 1970 UNESCO Convention is like a watchdog with-
out any teeth; enforcement is simply impossible.' 29
Similarly, the United States should rescind its reserva-
tions and one understanding to the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion, thus giving full effect to the treaty. Also, the United
126. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
127. Preamble, UNESCO Convention.
128. See, e.g., the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis, the Bosnian atrocities, and the crises
in Somalia and Haiti. Such problems are certain to persist unless the United
States takes an active international role. In fact, before withdrawal from
UNESCO in 1984, the United States contributed over $60 million to UNESCO,
approximately one-quarter of its budget. Why UNESCO?, WASH. POST, April 9,
1993, at 22.
129. See 3 O'KEEFE & PRor, supra note 1, at 797.
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States government should lead a concerted effort to gain com-
plete compliance and acceptance of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention among the other art-importing states of the world.
As the Preamble states, the problem can be addressed only
through international cooperation among the members of the
global community. 130 To that end the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention must be self-executing and must include enforcement
powers under the auspices of the United Nations and the
UNESCO General Conference. Much as the world brought
moral weight to bear on apartheid in South Africa and on
human rights abuses in other countries, so too should inter-
national moral persuasion be used to combat this damaging
black market.
With regard to the 1970 UNESCO Convention itself, sev-
eral articles within that document must be amended to pro-
vide for greater efficiency in stopping the illicit art trade;
such amendments must be consistent with the Preamble's
call for an organization operating "both nationally and inter-
nationally among States working in close co-operation."131
Article I should be reworded to provide for a more expan-
sive definition of cultural property. In order to avoid the cate-
gorical limits imposed under the current language, 132 Article
I should provide that a signatory state must state simply that
a particular item is important to its cultural heritage,
thereby triggering the import, export, and reciprocal-import
controls described in other sections of the Convention.
1 33 Ar-
ticle I would then read as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "cultural
property" means property which, on secular or religious
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being
of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, litera-
ture, art or science, or other national or cultural pur-
pose, and including but not limited to, whieh belong&
te the following categories:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, miner-
als and anatomy, and objects of paleontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of
science and technology and military and social history, to
130. Preamble, UNESCO Convention, supra note 2.
131. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 224.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
133. See, e.g. Articles III, VI, VII & IX, UNESCO Convention, supra note 2.
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the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists
and to events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including reg-
ular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or
archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest, such as;
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced en-
tirely by hand on any support and in any material (exclud-
ing industrial designs and manufactured articles deco-
rated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in
any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in
any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, docu-
ments and publications of special interest (historical, ar-
tistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in
collection;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinemat-
ographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old
and old musical instruments.
Such an expansive interpretation is consistent with the
view that a signatory state should have the right to deter-
mine for itself what it defines as its cultural heritage. This
makes perfect sense because only that particular party has a
true understanding of the relevance of certain items to its
cultural heritage.
Article III must be fully implemented by signatory states
so that there may be a clear vehicle by which aggrieved par-
ties can retrieve their stolen cultural property.
Article VI must also be fully implemented by the United
States and other art-market nations, if only to provide model
export control systems for developing nations. It is clear that
the art-market states have significant cultural heritage of
their own to protect, and they should take steps to see that
this heritage is protected. This will serve as a beacon of lead-
ership to other parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention in
the effort to stop the illegal trade in cultural property.
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Article VII(a) should be changed to force member parties
to prevent any persons, whether museums, institutions or
private collectors, from acquiring illegally exported cultural
property. Furthermore, the United States should drop its in-
sistence that this section applies only to state-run institu-
tions and museums. Clearly, the meaning of Article VII (a)
should cover any institution, museum, or private collector
who illegally imports cultural property. While policing pri-
vate collectors may seem difficult, this provision really is not
problematic if operated in conjunction with a fully imple-
mented Article VI. Close supervision of import and export of
cultural property through export certificates will make the
customs work significantly easier.
Article VII(b) should also explicitly prohibit the importa-
tion of cultural property stolen from newly discovered
archaeological sites. The requirement that material be docu-
mented should be dropped. Similarly, this provision should
be retroactive. This will help art-exporting countries retrieve
cultural property stolen before implementation of the 1970
UNESCO Convention. Furthermore, UNESCO should pro-
vide assistance for those art-rich countries that cannot pro-
cess claims by themselves; by processing claims through
UNESCO, some of the vagaries and diplomatic hurdles out-
lined earlier might be avoided.
After amendment, Article VII would read as follows:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake:
(a) To take the necessary measures, cnsistent with na-
tiol legislaton, to prevent museums and similar insti-
tutions within their territories from acquiring cultural
property originating in another State Party which has
been illegally exported after entry into forcc cf this Con
ventteaF in the States concerned. Whenever possible, to
inform a State of origin Party to this Convention of an of-
fer of such cultural property removed from that State af-
ter the cnty ito forcc f this Convention in both States;
(b)(i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen
from a museum or a religious or secular publie monument
or similar institution, public or private, in another
State Party to this Convention after the cntry into forcc of
thier Con:vcntion for the States concerned, pFevided that
such property is documented as appertaining to the inven
tory of that intitution;
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(b)(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin or by
request of the UNESCO authority, to take appropriate
steps to recover and return any such cultural property im-
ported after the cntr; into force of this Convention in both
States . nr-n d, provided, however, that the requesting
State shall pay just compensation to an innocent pur-
chaser or to a person who has valid title to that property.
Requests for recovery and return shall be made through
diplemati effles the appropriate UNESCO author-
ity. The requesting Party shall furnish, at its expense,
the documentation and other evidence necessary to estab-
lish its claim for recovery and return. The Parties shall
impose no customs duties or other charges upon cultural
property returned pursuant to this Article. All expenses
incident to the return and delivery of the Cultural prop-
erty shall be borne by the requesting Party.
Such an amendment will subject private institutions to
the goals of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and will rest en-
forcement authority within the power of the United Nations
UNESCO General Conference. Furthermore, it will elimi-
nate the loophole discussed earlier, because fresh dig sites,
and other non-catalogued materials, may now qualify for Ar-
ticle VII protection. These changes will make enforcement of
the 1970 UNESCO Convention much more efficient and
much more effective in meeting the goals as outlined in the
Preamble.13
4
Article IX should be extended to cover any designations
of cultural property as covered by the crisis provisions of this
section. As has been pointed out, many countries have pil-
lage problems that are completely unrelated to archaeological
or ethnological materials. 35 Article IX would then appear as
follows:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural
patr-imeny heritage is in jeopardy from pillage of arehaeo
logical c ethn legical materials of cultural property,
as designated under Article I, may call upon other
States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to this
Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to partici-
pate in a concerted international effort to determine and
to carry out all necessary concrete means, including the
control of exports and imports and international com-
134. See supra note 30.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 101-108.
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merce in the specific mater!-i cultural property con-
cerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall
take provisional measures to the extent feasible to pre-
vent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the re-
questing State.
Such changes will advance the cause of more international
understanding of the article, as well as give more latitude for
international action in areas previously restricted to
"archaeological or ethnological materials."136 Adopting this
amendment will significantly increase the effectiveness of the
entire 1970 UNESCO Convention. The United States must
completely enforce this provision for the benefit of the inter-
national community.
These amendments will truly make the 1970 UNESCO
Convention an internationally effective treaty with benefi-
cial and substantive provisions that can be enforced by a des-
ignated appropriate international authority. This will ensure
that the goals of the Preamble are realized and will help curb
the illegal transfer of cultural property.
B. Amendments and Changes to the 1983 Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act
Short of completely adopting the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion as its own domestic law, the United States Congress
should at least do the following to provide effective domestic
legislation in the fight against the illegal import and export of
cultural property:
As they are the same in both laws, the changes proposed
in Articles I, III, VI, and VII of the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion should also be made in the companion United States do-
mestic legislation.
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The enactment of Article IX of the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention, as embodied in section 2602(c) of the C.C.P.I.A.,
must be amended to allow the President, in his discretion, to
act in all circumstances, regardless of whether the requesting
party has made similar arrangements with other countries.
Section 2602(a) would read:
(A)(1) If the President determines, after request is made
to the United States under article 9 of the Convention by
any State Party-
136. UNESCO Convention, supra note 2, at 230.
137. See supra section IV.A.
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(a) that the cultural patrimony heritage of the
State Party is in jeopardy from the pillage of archaeologi-
cal or ethnological cultural materials property of the
State Party;...
the President may, subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter, take the actions described in paragraph (2).
(A)(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the President may
enter into-
(a) a bilateral agreement with the State Party to ap-
ply the import restrictions set forth in section 2606 of this
title to the archacological or cthnological matriaI cul-
tural property of the State Party the pillage of which is
creating the jeopardy to the cultural pat.i.e heritage
of the State Party found to exist under paragraph (1)(a);
or
(b) a multilateral agreement with the State Party and
with one or more other nations (whether or not a State
Party) under which the United States will apply such re-
strictions, and the other nations will apply similar restric-
tions, with respect to such material.
(G)(1) The President may not entr- into a bilatral oA
multilateral agreement authorized by ubsn tin (a) of
thi feeotin unless the application of the import rostrc
tiScn ot forth in ostion 2606 of this title with scopgt to
the arehacologieal or cthalogiertal of the State.
Party making a reuct to the oUnitd Stats under avti
ec 9 of the Convention will be applied in conccrt with sim
ilar rcotretiens implemented, or to be implemented, by
these nations (whether or not State Par-tico) indi4dually
having a cignfe ant import trade in ueh mate90a EC
As the largest art-importing state1 3 g and as the leader of
the free world, the United States has the duty to stop such
importation whether or not other countries do the same.
Such import controls will go a long way toward discouraging
the illegal trade in cultural property by severely shrinking
the largest market and reducing the profits derived through
that avenue.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to point out many of the
inconsistencies and shortcomings both in the 1970 UTNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
138. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property and in the United States' companion legislation, the
1983 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act.
An analysis of each legislative scheme shows that both are
sadly lacking in any enforcement power, and both suffer from
lack of commitment among the international community to
resolving cultural property issues. Only through coordinated
international cooperation and accompanying domestic con-
cern will the problems addressed in this comment be solved.
The illegal import, export, and transfer of cultural prop-
erty is an ancient problem, but it is sorely in need of a mod-
ern, global solution. Just as former President Bush, at the
end of the Cold War, proclaimed a new world order to pro-
mote peace in our day, President Clinton and the United
States, acting through the United Nations, should make a
concerted effort to stop the invidious market in illegal art. No
one benefits from these acquisitions. In the end, we all lose,
because with each stolen artifact or piece of cultural property,
we, as a community of nations, hinder UNESCO's attempts
at promoting mutual understanding through cultural educa-
tion and exchange. It is only through such mutual under-
standing that nations can truly come to a greater knowledge
of what makes us at the same time so different, yet so simi-
lar. Said diversity of understanding is the root of what will
lead to a more peaceful and more productive world commu-
nity. That understanding is there for the taking, but the
wrong people are getting there first.
John P. Shinn
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